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1BRIEF OF AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) is the Nation’s
largest nonpartisan, individual-membership association of state legislators.1 ALEC
has approximately 2,000 members—nearly one-third of all state legislators in the
United States. It serves to advance Jeffersonian principles of individual liberty,
free and efficient markets, responsible and accountable government, and
federalism. ALEC has a number of interests in this litigation, reflected in its
official activities, policies, and publications.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA” or “Act”)
is an extraordinary law, founded on an expansive conception of federal legislative
authority that is literally without precedent in our Nation’s history, and
fundamentally incompatible with the principles of limited government held by
ALEC and its members. ACA’s individual mandate, which requires that virtually
all individuals living in the United States purchase and maintain health insurance
meeting federal specifications, is based on a sweeping view of federal legislative
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), amicus certifies that no counsel for
any party authored this brief in whole or in part, that no party or counsel made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief,
and that no person other than the amicus, its members, and its counsel made such a
monetary contribution. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/11/2011     Page: 13 of 44
2authority tantamount to the general police power the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution has long reserved to the States. See Reina v. United States, 364 U.S.
507, 510-11 (1960). ALEC and its members believe that such a theory of
congressional authority is incompatible with the Constitution’s enumeration of
federal powers, and will have profound effects on the relationship between the
federal Government and the States.
In 2008, ALEC developed influential model legislation, the Freedom of
Choice in Health Care Act, that brought national attention to State-level opposition
to the Administration’s health reform agenda.2 The model act served as the basis
for legislation that was found to give the Commonwealth of Virginia standing in
Virginia ex rel. Cucinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010),
Virginia’s first-in-the-nation challenge to the ACA.
The ACA’s individual mandate is incompatible with ALEC’s State-level
efforts to reform health care and secure broader coverage through market-driven,
cost-effective measures that preserve individual liberty and State sovereignty. For
instance, ALEC’s Model High Risk Health Insurance Pool Model Act (2003), is
designed to make affordable health insurance coverage available for individuals
2 See, e.g., Monica Davey, Health Care Overhaul and Mandatory Coverage
Stir States’ Rights Claims, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/us/29states.html (discussing ALEC model
legislation).
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3with preexisting conditions and the medically uninsurable, through a state- and
industry-funded high-risk pool. As of 2010, 35 states had created high-risk pools
guaranteeing universal access to health insurance without mandates or market-
distorting price controls.
ALEC also has long supported market-based solutions to the rising costs of
health coverage, which numerous states have already adopted in varying forms.
Such efforts are called into question—if not directly displaced by—ACA’s
homogenizing federal mandate. ALEC’s Model Health Care Choice Act for States
(2007), for instance, would allow individuals to purchase quality, affordable health
insurance across state lines, in contrast to current policy, which restricts individuals
to coverage sold within their State, constraining choices and increasing costs. And
ALEC’s Model Mandated Benefits Review Act (2002) helps keep health coverage
affordable by providing an institutional check on mandated health insurance
benefits (i.e., benefits individuals are required to “purchase” if they want to buy
health coverage at all).
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4STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the expansive reading of federal legislative authority necessary to
sustain the ACA’s “individual mandate” exceeds Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause, as well as core principles of
federalism?
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Plaintiffs-Appellees persuasively demonstrate that ACA’s individual
mandate exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause; that the District Court correctly concluded that the
individual mandate is not severable; and that (as argued by the States) ACA’s
expansion of Medicaid exceeds Congress’ Spending Clause authority. We do not
attempt to repeat the full constitutional analysis set forth in those briefs.
Rather, as amicus curiae, ALEC undertakes the more limited task of
demonstrating that the ACA’s individual mandate—and the expansive theory of
federal legislative authority the Government has developed to defend it—are
inconsistent with core constitutional principles of federalism that constrain the
scope of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. ALEC and its member
legislators recognize that upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate
would have profound effects on the State-federal relationship. The individual
mandate represents a high-water mark for the assertion of federal legislative
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5authority, transgressing long-established boundaries between state and federal
legislation, and disrupting an array of State-level legislative and regulatory
initiatives. The ACA cannot be reconciled with the core values of “our
federalism,” which protects “each State’s freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments’” designed to “tailor local programs to
local needs.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973)
(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
Principles of federalism and enumerated powers lie at the core of the
Supreme Court’s modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the
expansion of congressional authority to reflect the modern U.S. economy, the
Supreme Court has consistently articulated the need for definite boundaries on the
Commerce power. Two longstanding principles are that the Commerce Clause
must not be construed so broadly as to “‘obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local,’” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 310 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)), and that the Constitution reserves to
the States, and denies the federal Government, a general police power. These
constraints apply with particular force in areas where States have historically
possessed primary regulatory authority.
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6Upholding the ACA’s individual mandate would disregard these
fundamental principles. At bottom, the Government claims authority to force
individuals to participate not only in interstate commerce, but in local, intrastate
commerce, on the theory that individual abstention from purchasing health
insurance (whether stemming from a conscious decision or simple inattention)
negatively affects the market for health insurance as compared to when individuals
uniformly purchase insurance under a federal mandate. The Government’s theory
of the Commerce power admits of no principled limit, as Congress could mandate
activity that affects interstate commerce with respect to nearly every individual
decision, amounting to a general federal police power. Moreover, regulation of
public health and welfare has historically been understood as a core component of
the sovereignty reserved to the States. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560, 569 (1991) (“The traditional police power of the States is defined as the
authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals. . . .”).
Similar federalism principles constrain Congress’ authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. That Clause cannot sustain legislation that violates
the Constitution’s textual and structural protections for state sovereignty, as such
laws are not “proper,” but mere “usurpations” of authority. Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The
ACA’s individual mandate fails to “properly account[] for state interests,” United
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7States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1962 (2010), as it vests no discretion in the
States to avoid regulation in this area of traditional state authority; disrupts and
homogenizes a range of ongoing State legislative efforts; and grants the federal
Government a general police power.
The experience of ALEC and its member legislators demonstrates that the
individual mandate will disrupt or displace a vibrant array of health reforms
currently being undertaken by numerous States. Such initiatives include market-
based, cost-effective solutions such as the creation by some 35 States of high-risk
pools to provide insurance to individuals who are otherwise medically uninsurable.
The federalism costs of the ACA are heightened by the fact that Congress’s rush to
legislative judgment interrupted this active and ongoing State-level dialogue, just
as a critical mass of States has begun to develop legislation tailored to their
particular circumstances, and before they had an adequate opportunity to operate in
their intended role as “laboratories of democracy” to develop programs that other
States could emulate.
ARGUMENT
“[D]eeply ingrained in our constitutional history” is the proposition that the
“‘Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers,’ while reserving a
generalized police power to the States.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
618 n.8 (2000) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992)).
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8That core principle has long informed the Supreme Court’s efforts to delineate
clear boundaries for Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause. ALEC agrees with, and does not attempt to
replicate, the compelling constitutional analysis set forth in the briefs for the
Plaintiffs-Appellees. Rather, ALEC focuses on the federalism implications of the
Government’s expansive theory of federal legislative authority, which transgresses
longstanding limits on Congress’ legislative authority and divests the States of
their traditional role as policy innovators in an area of historic State authority and
sovereignty.
I. The Individual Mandate Exceeds Congress’ Authority Under the
Commerce Clause, as Informed by Core Principles of Federalism.
A. Core principles of federalism constrain Congress’ Commerce Clause
authority, and deny the federal government a general police power.
The Supreme Court’s modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence rests on an
irreducible “first principle[]” of federalism: that the “enumerated powers”
delegated to the federal Government by the Constitution are “‘few and defined,’”
while “‘[t]hose which . . . remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.’” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting The Federalist No. 45, at 292-93
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Congress exercises its Article I
authorities “subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution,” including the
Tenth Amendment. New York, 505 U.S. at 155-56. “[T]he Constitution divides
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9authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.
State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens
the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” Id. at 181 (internal
quotations and citation omitted); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
From its early efforts to reconcile core federalism principles with Congress’
expanded role in regulating the Nation’s modern, industrialized economy, the
Supreme Court expressed “the fear that [without principled boundaries on the
Commerce power] ‘there would be virtually no limit to the federal power and for
all practical purposes we should have a completely centralized government.’”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935)). While the Court’s precise doctrinal formulations have
varied, one enduring guidepost is that the Commerce power “is subject to outer
limits” and must be construed “‘in the light of our dual system of government.’”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37). The
Clause must never be read to “‘effectually obliterate the distinction between what
is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.’” Id.
In addition to regulating the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, Congress may regulate activities that “substantially affect” interstate
commerce. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). In defining the outer
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boundaries of this aspect of the Commerce power, the Supreme Court has shown
particular solicitude for areas in which States historically have “‘possess[ed]
primary authority,’” including criminal law, education, and family law. See Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)); id.
at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (courts “must inquire whether the exercise of
national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern”);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
When Congress attempts to legislate in such areas, it “displace[s] state
policy choices” and affects the “sensitive relation[s]” between the federal
Government and the States. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). There is “no better” an example of a power historically reserved
to the States than the general police power: “[T]he Founders denied the National
Government” a “‘plenary police power’” and instead “reposed [it] in the States.”
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566); see also Comstock,
130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“Residual power,
sometimes referred to (perhaps imperfectly) as the police power, belongs to the
States and the States alone.”). And as the Supreme Court has previously explained
in adjudicating a conflict between federal and state regulation of public health, “the
structure and limitations of federalism[] . . . allow the States great latitude under
their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
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comfort, and quiet of all persons.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006)
(internal quotations omitted).
The Supreme Court has also examined closely “the implications” of any
particular theory of Commerce Clause authority for the relationship between the
federal Government and the States. The Court has emphatically rejected, for
instance, an interpretation under which Congress could regulate “any activity that
it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens,” as it was
“difficult to perceive any limitation on [that conception of] federal power, even in
areas . . . where States historically have been sovereign.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
B. Upholding the individual mandate as a valid exercise of the
Commerce power would upset the federal-State balance and
effectively grant Congress a plenary police power.
The core principles of federalism that have informed the Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence are incompatible with the expansive reading of
the Commerce power necessary to sustain the ACA’s individual mandate. The
Government initially contends that the mandate is an appropriate exercise of the
Commerce power because it regulates “the way people pay for health care
services”—in particular, the practice of “obtaining health care services without
insurance.” Gov’t Br. 25-28. But the ACA does not regulate the practice of
“obtaining health care services without insurance”; rather, it mandates the purchase
of insurance, regardless of whether, when, or how an individual eventually obtains
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health care services. See States’ Br. 29-30; Br. for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees 9-
10.
The Government falls back on the argument that the individual mandate is
“essential” to offset the negative economic effects on the insurance market that
will otherwise result from the Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating
reforms. Under this theory, the Government contends, an individual’s inaction in
failing to purchase insurance “substantially affects” interstate commerce. Gov’t
Br. 25, 28-32. This conception of the “substantially affects” test is not only
without precedent in U.S. law, but creates grave federalism concerns by conferring
a plenary police power on the federal Government.
Under the “substantially affects” test, the Court has upheld Congress’s
authority to restrict purely intrastate activity that has undesirable effects on
interstate commerce, such as growing wheat, or cultivating marijuana, for private
use. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-18.
And the Court has upheld under that test Congress’ authority to remove burdens or
obstructions to interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-58 (1964). But the Supreme Court has counseled
caution in applying the “substantially affects” test, in recognition that its ready
application could obliterate the distinction between what is local and what is
national. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 567. At bottom, the Court has applied this test
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only to activity, and economic activity at that. It has never held, or even suggested,
that inactivity is an activity that obstructs or burdens interstate commerce. See Br.
for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees 21-28.
Legislative action such as the ACA that impinges in an entirely novel way
on the Constitution’s structural division of power and sovereignty raises unique
concerns. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010), for instance, the Supreme Court struck down a
novel multilevel for-cause removal restriction on an executive officer. The Court
emphasized that the statute at issue was “highly unusual” in light of “the past
practice of Congress,” and found as “‘[p]erhaps the most telling indication of the
severe constitutional problem . . . the lack of historical precedent for [such an
enactment].’” Id. at 3159 (quoting 537 F.3d 667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). So it is here. Even eighty years after the Supreme
Court first adopted its current broad reading of the Commerce Clause, it is telling
indeed that Congress has never before seen fit—even when confronted with a
World War, the Cold War, the Great Depression, recessions, oil shocks, farm
crises, the savings and loan crisis, and myriad other disruptions great and small—
to seek to regulate abstaining from economic activity under its Commerce power.
It is particularly troubling given the Court’s discomfort with extending application
of the Clause beyond “economic activity.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
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The Government’s theory in this case reduces to the idea that an individual’s
failure to purchase health insurance has a negative effect on the interstate market
for health insurance, as compared to when individuals uniformly purchase such
insurance under Government compulsion. But this bootstrapping rationale is
equally true—that is, trivially so—with respect to nearly every individual decision
not to participate in commerce: Congress can always conceive of some activity
which, if mandated, would substantially affect interstate commerce. Indeed, it is
difficult to conceive of an activity that, if mandated of every member of society,
would not “substantially affect[]” commerce, whether it would be getting an
annual physical or eating an apple a day. Put differently, the Government asks this
Court to transform Congress’ enumerated power to “regulate” interstate commerce,
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, into the boundless authority to “create” commerce by
mandating individual participation, and then to regulate the conscripted
participants based on their “involvement” in commerce.
Such a conception of the Commerce Clause is indistinguishable from a
plenary federal police power. In the field of health care, Congress could regulate a
wide array of personal decisions, such as exercise, diet, or even undergoing
particular medical procedures, based on the purported effects of abstention. Nor is
the Government’s theory limited to health care, as nearly every individual decision
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can be connected to a market through a potential Government mandate, including
decisions about food, clothing, transportation, or education, to name a few.
The Government resists the startling implications of its theory by suggesting
the “health care market” is “unique” because all individuals will participate in it at
some point, and participation without insurance shifts costs to others. Gov’t Br.
32. But the factual premise of the Government’s argument is mistaken: not all
individuals will receive health care during their lifetimes, due perhaps to religious
beliefs or individual preferences. See States’ Br. 30. Many more will receive
healthcare services for which they will pay, without insurance. More importantly,
cost-shifting is virtually ubiquitous in the modern welfare state, encompassing not
only government involvement in food and housing, but societal safety nets such as
bankruptcy protection or Medicaid. And as the State plaintiffs explain, the cost-
shifting in this case is largely of Congress’ own creation, stemming from the
requirement in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd, that hospitals provide emergency medical care regardless of ability to
pay. Congress cannot bootstrap a radical expansion of its Commerce power simply
by legislating cost-shifting measures. See States’ Br. 35-36.
The Government’s expansive conception of the Commerce power is
particularly troubling because protecting the public health is an essential
component of the States’ traditional police power. “[A] State’s power to regulate
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. . . for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens . . . is at the core of its
police power.” Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
In Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428
(1963), for instance, the Court characterized a statute “directly addressed to
protection of the public health” as “within the most traditional concept” of the
State police power. See also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (“It is a
traditional exercise of the States’ ‘police powers to protect the health and safety of
their citizens.’”) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996)). In
part for this reason, the Supreme Court recently recognized that displacing state
law by a uniform federal statute in the area of public health would “effect a radical
shift of authority from the States to the Federal Government”; on that basis the
Court declined to read the federal law to so “alter the federal-state balance.”
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. at 275.
II. The Individual Mandate Exceeds Congress’ Authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, as Informed by Core Principles of
Federalism.
Perhaps recognizing the weaknesses in its Commerce Clause arguments, the
Government devotes most of its efforts to contending that the individual mandate
can be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The briefs for the
Plaintiffs-Appellees demonstrate persuasively why the Government’s argument
must be rejected, and ALEC does not attempt to reproduce that analysis. Rather,
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ALEC again highlights the federalism principles that constrain Congress’ authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and explains why the individual mandate
threatens the State-federal balance of authority.
Congress may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution [its enumerated] Powers.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. In
Chief Justice Marshall’s canonical formulation, the Necessary and Proper Clause
grants Congress the “incidental” authority to use “means which are appropriate” to
“carr[y] into execution” its enumerated powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). But “[w]hen a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’
the Commerce Clause violates the principles of state sovereignty reflected in” the
Constitution’s text and structure, it is not “‘proper’” and thus “‘merely [an] ac[t] of
usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be treated as such.’” Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24
(quoting The Federalist No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton)); accord Comstock,
130 S. Ct. at 1957.
In its most recent exposition of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
Supreme Court adopted a multi-factor test for determining the scope of Congress’
“incidental” authority. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965. In Comstock, the
Court’s conclusion that a civil-commitment statute could be sustained under the
Necessary and Proper Clause depended on several contextual factors, including
“the long history of federal involvement” in “prison-related mental-health
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statutes”; the fact that the federal law served as a “reasonable extension” of past
federal statutes, id. at 1965, 1958; the statute’s “narrow scope,” id. at 1965; and—
most relevant here—“the statute’s accommodation of state interests,” id.
A. In exercising authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Congress must give proper account to “state interests.”
Comstock made clear that Congress’ exercise of authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause must “properly account[] for state interests.” 130
S. Ct. at 1962; see also id. at 1967-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“It is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes of state
sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”). Legislation resting on the Necessary and
Proper Clause must not “invade state sovereignty or otherwise improperly limit the
scope of powers that remain with the States.” Id. at 1962 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). In Comstock, the federal civil-commitment statute affirmatively
“require[d] accommodation of state interests” and essentially allowed States to
“opt out”: States had substantial discretion about whether to take custody of an
individual; could assert such authority “at any time”; and could displace the federal
Government’s role entirely by taking custody of a detainee. Id. at 1962-63. In
upholding that statute, the Court concluded that its interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause would not “confer on Congress a general ‘police power, which
the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States,’” id. at
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1964 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618), because the statute was “narrow in
scope,” applied to only a “small fraction of federal prisoners,” and was “limited” in
“reach” to individuals already in federal custody. Id. at 1964-65.
In Printz, the Court likewise concluded that a law impinging on aspects of
sovereignty reserved to the States under the Constitution was not “proper,” but
rather a federal “usurpation.” Id. As the Private Plaintiffs-Appellees observe, the
Court’s emphasis on state interests in Comstock and Printz is consistent with
Founding-era practice, which “‘suggests that a “proper” law is one that is within
the peculiar jurisdiction or responsibility of the relevant governmental actor.’” Br.
for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees 44 (quoting Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger,
The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 291 (1993)).
B. The ACA’s individual mandate fails to account for state interests.
Applying these principles, there can be little question that the ACA’s
individual mandate fails to account adequately for state interests and therefore is
not a “proper” means of carrying into execution Congress’ Commerce power. See
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962. The individual mandate “forecloses the States from
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay
claim by right of history and expertise”: the adoption of measures to protect public
health and welfare. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
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Hill, 530 U.S. at 715. As explained below, the ACA disrupts or displaces a wide
range of ongoing State and local policymaking initiatives that reflect the interests
and values of particular States. And unlike the civil commitment statute at issue in
Comstock, ACA’s individual mandate gives States no discretion to exempt their
citizens and provide an alternate State scheme. Nor do the States retain discretion
to oust the federal Government from any “appropriate role” the States would
ordinarily have discretion to perform. 130 S. Ct. at 1962-63.
That ACA impinges on state sovereignty is hardly a theoretical proposition.
Some nine States (Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia) have enacted laws expressly guaranteeing their
citizens the freedom to choose not to purchase health insurance, and Arizona and
Oklahoma have enacted constitutional amendments. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann.
§ 39-9003; Utah Code Ann. § 63M-1-2505.5; Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-3430.1:1;
Ariz. Const. art. 27, § 2 (as approved Nov. 2, 2010); see also Freedom of Choice in
Health Care Act. And the lack of any limiting principle for the Government’s
theory confers on Congress a de facto general police power long reserved to the
States. Cf. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964.
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III. Upholding the Individual Mandate Would “Displace State Policy
Choices” and Stifle the States’ Constitutional Role as Laboratories of
Democracy.
In addition to transgressing specific boundaries on the Commerce power and
Necessary and Proper Clause that have long been recognized by the Supreme
Court, the ACA’s individual mandate (and related provisions) “displace state
policy choices,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (internal quotations and citation
omitted), discouraging innovation and preventing “a single courageous State
[from], if its citizens choose, serv[ing] as a laboratory; and try[ing] novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice,
285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). ALEC and its member legislators have
considerable experience with an evolving array of State and local initiatives to
reform the health insurance market and to make health care more affordable
through market-driven, cost-effective mechanisms.
It bears emphasis that federal respect for States’ traditional roles as policy
innovators preserves great flexibility to the States in exercising their general police
power. Of particular relevance in the present context are the kinds of market-
based, cost-effective solutions that ALEC and its member legislators have long
advocated in pursuing health care reform at the State and local level. In this brief,
ALEC highlights only a few examples of initiatives that will be disrupted and, in
some cases, directly displaced by ACA’s homogenizing federal approach—not
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only through the individual mandate, but also related provisions, such as the
establishment of State-level high-risk pools governed by federal eligibility rules.
The details of particular State-level initiatives necessarily vary, but even a general
survey of some ongoing policy initiatives demonstrates the significant federalism
costs of sustaining the ACA’s blanket approach.
That many of these State-level initiatives are of comparatively recent vintage
highlights the federalism costs of ACA’s rush to legislative judgment. The ACA
interrupts an active and ongoing State-level dialogue just as it has begun to yield
results in a critical mass of States. By imposing a uniform federal mandate, ACA
not only displaces promising initiatives before they have had adequate opportunity
to prove their value, but also forestalls other States from learning from, adapting,
and improving upon policies with a demonstrated record of success.
One particularly significant trend of State-level innovation is the creation by
some 35 States of high-risk pools that provide insurance for individuals with
preexisting health conditions—prior to, and outside of, the similar pools required
by the ACA.3 These State high-risk pools provide coverage for individuals who
3 See Ala. Code §§ 27-52-1 to -6 (West 2010); Alaska Stat. §§ 21.55.010 to
.500 (2010); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 23-79-501 to -513 (2011); Cal. Ins. Code
§§ 12700-12739.4 (West 2011); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-8-501 to -534 (2010); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38a-556 (West 2011); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 627.648 to .6498 (West
2011); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 41-5501 to -5511 (West 2011); 215 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 105/1 to 105/15 (West 2011); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 27-8-10-1 to -11.2 (West
2011); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 514E.1 to .11 (West 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-2117
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would otherwise be denied access to individual market health insurance because of
pre-existing conditions. ALEC’s model High-Risk Health Insurance Pool Act
spreads the cost of insuring high-risk individuals across all insurance carriers doing
business in a State, without the need for an individual mandate. The federal health
exchanges created by ACA prohibit denying coverage or adjusting premiums
based on individual health status, and limit cost-sharing. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031-
18033. As a result, individuals enrolled in existing state high-risk pools will likely
switch to plans created under ACA.4
to -2131 (West 2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 304.17B-001 to -037 (2011); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 22:1201 to :1215 (2010); Md. Code Ann., Ins. §§ 14-501 to -
508 (2010); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 62E-10 (West 2011); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 83-9-201
to -222 (West. 2010); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 376.960 to .989 (West 2011); Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 33-22-1501 to -1524 (West 2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-4216 to -4233
(West 2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 404-G:5-a to :5-g (West 2011); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 59A-54-1 to -21 (West 2010); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-50-175 to -255 (West
2010); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 26.1-08-01 to -14 (West 2009); Okla. Stat. Ann.,
tit. 36, §§ 6531-6545 (West 2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 735.600 to .650 (2009); S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 38-74-10 to -90 (West 2010); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 58-17-115 to -
130 (West 2010); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-7-2901 to -2916 (West 2010); Tex. Ins.
Code Ann. §§ 1506.001 to .305 (West 2009); Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-29-101 to -
123 (West 2010); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 48.41.010 to .910 (West 2011);
W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 33-48-1 to -12 (West 2011); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 149.10 to .53
(West 2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 26-43-101 to -114 (West 2010).
4 The ACA may also undermine, even without displacing, a promising trend
of faith-based, voluntary, health care cost-sharing arrangements facilitated by
exemptions from regulation under State insurance codes. Some thirteen States
have created regulatory exemptions for such cost-sharing initiatives, through which
more than 100,000 Americans share more than $60 million per year for one
another’s health costs. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 624.1265 (West 2011); Iowa Code
Ann. § 505.22 (West 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-202(j) (West 2010); Ky. Rev.
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ALEC has also pursued incentive-based, market-driven solutions through
amendments to State tax codes that may be undermined, if not directly displaced,
by ACA. ALEC’s model Cancer Drug Donation Program Act, for instance,
establishes a voluntary system for cancer patients to donate unused prescription
drugs to uninsured and underinsured patients. Nine states have established
repositories to secure prescription drug access in this manner.5 Similarly, ALEC
has developed model legislation to provide tax deductions for qualified expenses
related to organ donation by living donors; sixteen states have enacted some form
of this legislation, helping defray costs of organ donation that are not covered by
traditional insurance.6
Stat. Ann. § 304.1-120(7) (West 2010); 956 Mass. Code Regs. 5.03(4)(c) (2011);
Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 1-202 (West 2010); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 376.1750 (West
2011); Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 36, § 110(11)(a)-(e) (West 2011); 40 Pa. Stat. Ann.
§ 23(b) (West 2010); Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-103(3)(c) (2010); Va. Code Ann.
§§ 38.2-6300 to -6301 (West 2010); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 600.01(1)(b)(9) (West
2011); see also S.B. 1122, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
5 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-35-103 (West 2011); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 499.029 (West 2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 194A.450 to .458 (West 2010);
Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 333.17780 (West 2011); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 151.55
(West 2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 37-7-1401 (2009); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-2422 to
-2430 (2010); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 457.400 to .490 (West 2010); 62 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. §§ 2921-2927 (West 2010).
6 See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 26-51-2101 to -2103 (West 2010); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 48-7-27(13)(A)-(B) (West 2010); Idaho Code Ann. § 63-3029K (West 2011);
Iowa Admin. Code 701-40.66(422) (2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:297(N)(1)-(2)
(2010); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.01(19b)(12) (West 2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 27-7-
18 (5)(A)-(B) (West 2010); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 57-38-30.3(2)(j) (West 2009);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-36 (West 2010); N.Y. Tax Law § 612(38)(A)-(B)
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/11/2011     Page: 36 of 44
25
ALEC has also worked to help states eliminate barriers to competition in the
insurance market, for instance through the model Health Care Choice Act for
States, which allows individuals to purchase quality, affordable health insurance
across state lines. As of 2010, 19 states had introduced—and Wyoming has
enacted—such legislation, which expands coverage choices and lowers costs.7
Health care choice legislation highlights an additional benefit from a pluralistic,
State-based approach: the substantial cost savings and efficiencies to be gained by
fostering interstate competition in the provision of health insurance. See, e.g.,
Sven R. Larson, The Health Care Choice Act: Lowering Costs by Allowing
Competition in the Individual Insurance Market, Prosperitas, vol. 9 (Oct. 2009).
Indeed, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office concluded that permitting
interstate competition in insurance sales would cut healthcare costs by five percent
and save the Government $12 billion. See Congressional Budget Office Cost
Estimate, H.R. 2355, Health Care Choice Act of 2005 (Sept. 12, 2005), available
at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=6639&type=0.
(McKinney 2010); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5747.01(A)(25) (West 2010); Okla.
Stat. Ann., tit. 68, § 2358(E)(21)(A)-(B) (West 2011); R.I. Gen. Laws. Ann. § 44-
30-12(7) (West 2010); Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-1015 (West 2010); Va. Code Ann.
§ 58.1-322(D)(13) (West 2010); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.05(1)(i)(1)-(3) (West 2010).
7 See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-18-205 (West 2010). The Arizona legislature
passed a health care choice provision in Senate Bill 1593, which was vetoed by the
Governor. The Georgia legislature passed similar legislation in House Bill 47,
which is currently on the Governor’s desk.
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ALEC has also supported legislation to provide a State-level institutional
check on mandated health insurance benefits (i.e., benefits individuals are required
to “purchase” if they want to buy health coverage at all). Twenty-seven states have
enacted mandated benefits review, helping to curb high-cost mandates that keep
health coverage unaffordable.8
ALEC has considerable experience in State-level policy initiatives that
ensure healthcare access for the poor. In August 2010, ALEC approved its model
Patients First Medicaid Reform Act, which establishes Medical Savings Accounts
for Medicaid beneficiaries, allowing individuals to use the accounts to purchase a
high-deductible health policy and pay for out-of-pocket medical expenses. And in
2008, ALEC developed a model State Children’s Health Insurance (SCHIP) Anti-
8 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-181 to -183 (2011); Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 127660-127665 (West 2011); Colo Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-16-103 (West
2011); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 624.215 (West 2011); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 33-24-60 to -67
(West 2010); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-51, -52 (West 2010); Ind. Code Ann. § 27-1-3-
30 (West 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-2248 to -2249 (West 2010); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 6.948 (West 2010); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24:603.1 (2010); Me. Rev. Stat.
tit. 24-A, § 2752 (2010); Md. Code Ann., Ins. §§ 15-1501 to -1502 (West 2010);
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 3, § 38C (West 2011); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 62J.26 (West
2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 400-A:39 (2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27D-1 to -9
(West 2011); N.Y. Ins. Law § 213 (McKinney 2010); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 54-
03-28 (West 2009); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 103.144 to .146 (West 2011); Or.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 171.870, .875, .880 (West 2011); Pa. Code, tit. 28, ch. 931 §§ 1-
4; Tenn. Code Ann. § 3-2-111 (West 2010); Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 38.251 to .254
(West 2009); Utah Code Ann. § 36-12-5 (West 2010); Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-2505
(West 2010) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 48.47.005, .010, .020, .030 (West 2011);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 601.423 (West 2011).
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Crowd Out Act, which encourages the use of private insurance by offering
premium assistance to individuals who are eligible for SCHIP, but also have access
to employer-sponsored coverage. ACA disrupts these and other innovative
proposals while they are still in the pipeline of policy development.9
The existence of this wide range of ongoing policy initiatives belies the
Government’s suggestion that individual States have “disincentives” to reform
health care and health insurance markets, for instance because of a risk that
successful policies would become a magnet for migration by the needy and
dependant, or because private insurance providers might flee a State adopting
restrictive insurance practices. Gov’t Br. 48-49. Moreover, a burgeoning literature
provides strong empirical evidence that successful State policies are likely to
“diffuse” elsewhere when States have freedom to tailor their local policies. See
Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 294 (2006). In particular, one
study has demonstrated that “changes that reined in the cost of the CHIP program
were made in ways that emulated the cost-saving activities of successful
9 To similar effect, ALEC’s model Long Term Care Tax Credit Act provides
a state income tax credit to encourage seniors to purchase private insurance to meet
their needs and preserve Medicaid for the truly needy. ALEC’s model Medical
School Loan Repayment Act encourages physicians to practice in underserved
areas by requiring the state to repay up to $50,000 of medical school loans for a
physician who agrees to practice in a “medical shortage” area.
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governments elsewhere.” Id. at 310. The importance of the State interests at stake
here counsels caution, not haste, before Congress may determine that State efforts
are fruitless and a uniform federal solution is appropriate.
In a system that fosters pluralism among the several States, it is perhaps
unsurprising that some States, acting as amici to this Court, apparently welcome
the policies reflected in the ACA notwithstanding potential infringement on their
sovereignty. See Br. of the States of Oregon et al. as Amici Curiae 25-30. But
direct federal involvement in an area of high costs and frequent State budget
shortfalls raises federalism concerns of a different sort: the potential to discourage
States’ traditional innovation and instead foster dependency on the central
Government in an area of traditional state responsibility. In part for this reason,
“[S]tate acquiescence to federal regulation cannot expand the bounds of the
Commerce Clause,” under which Congress’ authority cannot be “‘enlarged’” by
the “‘non-exercise of state power.’” Raich, 545 U.S. at 29 (quoting United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)); New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (“Where Congress
exceeds its authority relative to the States, . . . the departure from the constitutional
plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of State officials.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, this Court should affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
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